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6.1  Introduction 
A major issue in  the discussion of  the effects of  multinational firms’ 
operations on host country employment has been whether these firms use 
“inappropriately” capital-intensive methods of production and are there- 
fore responsible in some degree for underutilization of  the presumably 
abundant labor, or unskilled labor, resources of less developed countries. 
There are many aspects to this issue; here we  consider one: whether 
multinational firms respond to differences in labor costs by  using more 
labor-intensive methods of  production  where labor costs are low. In 
contrast to the case studies that have examined this question in individual 
countries or industries, our work investigates the pattern that emerges 
from an analysis of the main manufacturing industries across many coun- 
tries. We make particular use of data on multinational firms collected by 
the Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) of  the United States Depart- 
ment of Commerce for 1966 and 1970 and similar data for Swedish-based 
multinational firms collected by  the Industriens Utredningsinstitut  of 
Stockholm for 1970 and 1974. 
Robert E. Lipsey is associated with NBER and with Queens College, City University of 
New York; Irving B. Kravis is associated with NBER and with the University of Pennsyl- 
vania; and Romualdo A. Roldan is associated with Chase Econometrics. 
We are indebted to Dennis Bushe and Linda O’Connor, helped in the late stages by 
Stanley Lewis, for statistical calculations and programming, and to Arnold Gilbert and 
Michael Liliestedt for programming and advice on United States Department of Commerce 
data. Anne 0. Krueger, Hal B. Lary, and several referees read the paper carefully and 
made valuable comments on it. The Industriens Utredningsinstitut provided hospitality in 
Stockholm and information and calculations on Swedish multinational firms from its sur- 
veys, and Birgitta Swedenborg guided us in using the Swedish data and supervised the 
Swedish calculations. We are grateful also to the City University of New York for a grant of 
computer time. 
215 216  Robert E. LipseylIrving B. KravislRomualdo A. Roldan 
The question  of  degree of  adaptation to  factor costs has received 
considerable attention.  Unfortunately  there are many possible defini- 
tions of  adaptation, and a good deal of  effort has been spent, often 
unprofitably, we believe, in attempting to distinguish one from another. 
A question frequently raised is whether any observed differences be- 
tween production methods in developed countries and those in LDCs are 
the result of  factor substitution within a single technology (along a single 
production function), as in figure 6.1, or the result of  the use of  a more 
labor-intensive technology in  LDCs:  one that would be  more  labor- 
intensive under any set of factor price ratios, as in figure 6.2. Observed 
differences in factor input ratios could be a combination of  substitution 
between and within technologies, as in figure 6.3.  Courtney and Leipziger 
(1975), for example, assume two technologies in each industry-one  for 
developed country affiliates of  each firm and one for affiliates in LDCs. 
They  fit  production  functions accordingly and  attempt to divide the 
observed differences between DC  and LDC factor use ratios (k,  and k3  in 
fig. 6.3) into the unobserved  differences between k, and k2 (ex ante 
substitution in their terms) and the unobserved differences between k2 
and k3 (ex post substitution). “By ex ante factor substitution we refer to 
choices of plant design and by ex post factor substitution, we refer to the 
way in which the plant is run” (Courtney and Leipziger 1975, p. 297). 
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Fig. 6.1  Substitution of  capital for labor within a single technology. 217  Do Multinational Firms Adapt Factor Proportions to Factor Prices? 
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Fig. 6.3  Substitution of  labor for capital between and within technolo- 
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In our study we have not only compared parent companies, DC  affili- 
ates, and LDC affiliates as groups, but  also compared affiliates in an 
industry across all countries, treating individual affiliates or  the aggregate 
of  affiliates in a country as the units of  observation. The parent firm is 
viewed  as having a technology set consisting of  a variety of  ways of 
producing that differ in their capital intensity. The question is whether 
the parent firm’s choices from this technology set for use in  different 
countries reflect differences in factor costs. Of  course this picture of  a 
single technology set is a simplification, more appropriate for a single 
product than for the heterogeneous industries distinguished in any avail- 
able collection of  data. 
We concentrate on the observed differences in factor proportions (the 
difference between kl and k3  in fig. 6.3) and relate them to differences in 
factor  prices.  We examine  the relationships  taking  as  our  units  of 
observation for a country, in turn, manufacturing  as a whole,  broad 
industries, and individual firms. We ask what adaptation there is to host 
country factor prices, how much of  it takes place through the selection of 
industries (labor-intensive industries producing in low-wage countries), 
how much takes place through the selection of  firms within each industry 
(labor-intensive firms in each industry producing in low-wage countries) , 
and, finally, how much takes place through the choice of  factor propor- 
tions within industries or firms. 
At the most aggregative level, among broad industries such as textiles 
or chemicals, adaptation by  selection of  industries means that labor- 
intensive industries based in high-wage countries establish affiliate pro- 
duction  in  low-wage countries more frequently,  or at  a higher  level 
relative to home output, than do capital-intensive industries from high- 
wage countries, In other words, if  there is adaptation by industry selec- 
tion, the share of  labor-intensive industries will be higher among affiliates 
in low-wage countries than among home-country industries or affiliates in 
high-wage countries. Such selection could be represented by figure 6.2 if 
we relabeled DC  and LDC technology and factor proportions as instead 
referring to industry A (noninvestor or investor in high-wage countries) 
and industry B (investor in low-wage countries). 
Virtually all industries defined by statistical classifications are heter- 
ogeneous in the sense that they include more and less labor-intensive 
firms. The more labor-intensive firms within each industry might choose 
to relocate their production to foreign countries with low wage levels, 
while more capital-intensive firms did not invest abroad at all or chose 
locations with high wage levels. That would be adaptation by selection of 
firms within an industry. Again, such selection could be represented in 
figure 6.2  by substituting firm A and firm B technology and factor propor- 
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In the cases of selection of investing industries and investing firms there 
are, of course, influences other than the price of labor on the extent and 
location of  foreign operations. It has been suggested, in fact, that the 
typical advantage of United States firms, which enables them to compete 
effectively in foreign markets with host country firms and other foreign 
firms, is technological skill. If  high technology is associated with high 
capital intensity there will be a tendency for capital-intensive firms and 
industries to locate abroad. For firms in a home country with high labor 
costs, such a tendency will operate in the opposite direction from the 
influence of labor costs on the selection of industries and firms to operate 
abroad. Also operating against the influence of labor costs would be high 
capital intensity in industries based on natural resource availability if the 
natural resources were concentrated in countries with low labor costs. 
Even within the firm there could be differences in the type of  output 
produced in different countries. Since the typical firm produces more 
than one final or intermediate output and can supply one market by 
production from another market, it will have an incentive to produce the 
labor-intensive product in  LDCs and the capital-intensive product  in 
developed countries or at home. This phenomenon would appear in the 
statistical data as substitution of  labor for capital in LDCs even if  each 
product were produced in exactly the same way at home and abroad. 
Since most large firms’ home country operations extend over several 
industries, the selection of products within the firm may be a selection not 
only among the products of  a single industry but also among the indus- 
tries of  the parent. Once again we could represent the selection using 
figure 6.2,  with products A and B, produced in high-wage and low-wage 
countries respectively, substituted for DC and  LDC technology and 
factor proportions. 
Thus there are three types of  adaptation to low wages in LDCs that 
involve selection rather than the adaptation of production processes. One 
is the greater  tendency  of  labor-intensive industries,  compared  with 
capital-intensive industries, to move production to low-wage countries. 
The second is the same tendency for labor-intensive firms within any 
industry. The third is, for a given firm, the same tendency to select among 
products or production processes. Of course the division between adapta- 
tion by  selection among industries and adaptation by  selection within 
industries depends on the fineness of  the industry classification. The 
broader the industry groups, the more apparent adaptation within indus- 
tries; the narrower the industries, the more important industry selection 
appears. 
Also embedded in factor proportions comparisons among countries 
may  be  differences in capital intensity due to differences in  scale of 
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Fig. 6.4 
would  be  obscured  if  a single production  function were fitted to all 
countries, assuming homotheticity. Differences in factor proportions that 
were really related to scale of  production would then be attributed to 
factor prices, since these are, among countries, generally related to scale 
of  production, the least developed countries having both low labor costs 
and  small plants.  In  figure 6.4, for  example,  the existence of  some 
indivisibilities in plant or capital equipment means that capital-intensive 
methods of  production  (DC scale) would be used  only in  developed 
countries, resulting in  factor proportion A. Labor-intensive methods 
would be used in LDCs, resulting in factor proportion C. If  the produc- 
tion  function  were  assumed to be  homothetic, the  entire  difference 
between A and C would be attributed to factor price differences, even 
though  at  LDC scale DC factor  prices would  bring  about  a capital 
intensity only as high as B. 
In our direct comparisons of  capital intensities between developed 
countries and LDCs we are, in effect, treating low capital intensities that 
result from small-scale operations in LDCs as one more form of  adapta- 
tion to low labor costs. Although the differences in capital intensities 
between LDC affiliates and parents or DC affiliates in such a case do not 
represent substitution along an isoquant, they may still be a consequence 
of differences in factor costs. Low labor costs in LDCs may make eco- 
nomical the operation  of  small labor-intensive plants  that would  be 
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A  more fundamental difficulty plagues  attempts to measure  scale 
effects from production functions fitted to data across countries. Typi- 
cally no physical output data are available, and output is measured by 
value added. This practice biases the result toward obscuring economies 
of  scale, if  they exist. Presumably, plants of  uneconomically small size, 
perhaps in markets too small to sustain plants of  optimal size, can survive 
only  if  they  are afforded  high  protection  or subsidies.  The level of 
protection must be high enough to provide standard levels of wages for 
the workers  and profits  sufficient  to  attract  and retain  capital. Each 
worker enters the production function on the right-hand side, and his 
wage enters  on the left,  in value added. Each unit of  capital is also entered 
on both sides of the function because the investment (on the right-hand 
side) will not be made unless the level of protection or subsidy is sufficient 
to provide a standard return, which enters the equation on the left-hand 
side. 
Within a single economy the presumption is that all producers must sell 
at the same price, since they are in competition with each other. Any 
inefficiently small plant with too many workers per unit of output would 
have the high wage bill included in its value added; but, since it is selling 
in competition with, and at the same price as, efficient plants, the in- 
efficiency will be reflected in a low or  even negative return on capital, and 
a low or negative value added, which will truly reflect net output. The 
same would happen in the case of  a plant with too much capital per unit of 
output. What is different in a comparison across countries is that prices 
need not be the same  if there are trade barriers and plants in one country 
that do not compete freely with those in another. The value added by 
inefficient plants is inflated in segregated, protected markets. The results 
in studies across countries are thus biased toward proportionality be- 
tween inputs and outputs: that is, constant returns to scale.' This analysis 
assumes, of  course, that the degree of  protection  is that needed for 
survival by  inefficient  plants  rather than that achieved  by  politically 
powerful firms or industries seeking high profits. 
6.2  Data 
The basic data for our analysis came from two sources: surveys of the 
foreign operations of  United  States firms by the Bureau of  Economic 
Analysis (BEA), formerly the Office of  Business Economics (OBE) of 
the United States Department of  Commerce, and surveys of  foreign 
operations of  Swedish  firms  by  the Industriens  Utredningsinstitut  of 
Stockholm. The United States surveys took place in 1966 (a complete 
census) and 1970, and the Swedish surveys, believed to have virtually 
complete coverage, took place in 1970 and 1974. The United States data 
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and the 1970 Swedish data in Swedenborg (1973,1979). The Swedish data 
for 1974 had not yet been published at the time these calculations were 
done and are therefore referred to below as unpublished data. 
Although the United States and Swedish survey questionnaires are 
very similar, there are differences that are reflected in the way they are 
used below. The United States data give more detailed balance-sheet 
information, including net and gross book values for property, plant, and 
equipment. The Swedish data provide  a breakdown of  products  and 
industries for both parents and overseas subsidiaries and also, in addition 
to book value, the value of  property, plant, and equipment based on fire 
insurance values, an approximation to current gross market value. Al- 
though the fire insurance valuation presumably does not include reval- 
uations of  land, we are inclined to the view that it is better than book 
value as an estimate of  the amount of  capital in market values. The 
United States data, on the other hand, characterize each parent and each 
affiliate only by its single most important industry affiliation and provide 
only book values of  assets. 
6.3  Factor Proportions of Domestic Industry, Parent Companies, 
and Foreign Affiliates: Aggregate Data 
The basic facts about capital intensity for all manufacturing in multina- 
tionals’ home countries, home country operations of parent companies, 
and foreign affiliates are set out in table 6.1. In every case for which we 
have data to make  a comparison, capital intensity in home country 
domestic manufacturing as a whole and in parent companies’ domestic 
operations was higher than  in  foreign affiliates, even those in  other 
developed countries. And capital intensities of  affiliate operations in 
other developed countries were consistently higher than those of  opera- 
tions in less developed countries. The comparisons clearly indicate that 
some form of adaptation to differences in wage levels does take place and 
that the adaptation, or the sum of  all the different types of  adaptation, 
was large. Capital intensities of affiliates in less developed countries were 
typically 40 percent or more below those of  parents or home countries. 
As we mentioned earlier, there are many possible reasons for such 
differences. One is that we are observing only industry selection. The 
more labor-intensive industries might choose to go abroad to benefit from 
lower wage levels, particularly in less developed countries, but might 
produce abroad exactly as at home. A test for this possibility is to make 
comparisons of capital intensity within industries, as in tables 6.2 and 6.3. 
If  all the differences in table 6.1  were accounted for by industry selection 
there would be no differences within industries. If  industry selection were 
unimportant, the differences in tables 6.2 and 6.3 would be as large as 
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Table 6.1  Capital Intensity (Capital per Employee) 
in Manufacturing, United States and Swedish 
Domestic Industry, Parents, and Foreign Affiliates 
Value per Employee 
Foreign Affiliates 
Less 
Domestic  Developed  Developed 
CaDital Stock Measure  Industrv  Parents  Countries  Countries 
United States 
Total assets 
Net property, plant, and 
equipment, book value 
Sweden 
Total assets 
Net property, plant, and 
equipment, book value 
Gross property, plant and 
equipment, fire insurance 
value 
1966  n.a. 
1970  n.a. 
1966  11.7b 
1970  14.6‘ 
1960  n.a. 
1965  n.a. 
1970  117.6 
1974  176.0 
1970  31.9 
1974  40.2 
1970  108.0 
1974  177.5 
Thousands of  Dollars 
22.1”  17.0  14.8 
29.3  20.8  16.2 
8.6=  6.7  5.7 
12.0  8.0  6.0 
Thousands of  Kronor 
n.a.  37.9d  27.7 
n.a.  57.8d  38.7 
n.a.  91.9d  59.0 
n.a. 
n.a.  25.7  19.4 
n.a.  35.1  22.6 
n.a.  50.8  29.2 
206.8  73.2  43.9 
SOURCES:  United  States  Department  of  Commerce  (1972),  Sweden,  Statistiska 
Centralbyran  (1972a, b, 1976a, b), Swedenborg  (1973),  and unpublished  data of  the 
Industriens Utredningsinstitut. 
”Includes only those parents reporting in 1970. 
bGross  property plant and equipment for 1967; 1966 not available. 
‘Gross property, plant, and equipment. 
‘Includes Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. No Japanese 
manufacturing subsidiaries are reported. 
It is clear that, even within broad industry groups, home production is 
most capital-intensive, production in developed country affiliates next, 
and production in LDC affiliates least capital-intensive. In the case of the 
United States (table 6.2), twenty-two out of  twenty-four possible com- 
parisons between parents and developed country affiliates show parent 
production more capital-intensive. All sixteen possible comparisons be- 
tween  developed country affiliates and those in  LDCs show that the 
former are more capital-intensive, and all sixteen possible comparisons 
show parent production more capital-intensive than affiliate production 
in LDCs. Adaptation, in other words, is visible within industries, at least 
within industry groups as broad as these. That impression is strengthened 
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parent capital intensity show at least as much relation to the type of host 
country as do the aggregates, and possibly more in the case of  LDCs. 
The adaptation in capital intensity shown by manufacturing industry as 
a whole in table 6.1, put in index form in the “all manufacturing” rows of 
table 6.2, can be divided into two parts. One is the adaptation within 
industries, and the other is adaptation by selection among broad indus- 
Table 6.2  Capital Intensity (Capital per Employee) 
in Manufacturing Industry Groups, United States Parents 
and Foreign Affiliates (Unit: Thousand Dollars per Employee) 
1970  1966” 
Affiliates in  Affiliates in 
Manufacturing 
Industry  Developed  Developed 
Group  Parents  Countries  LDCs  Parents  Countries  LDCs 
Food products 
Chemicals and allied 
products 
Primary and fabricated 
metals 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Other 
All manufacturing 
Average of  industry 
relativesb 
Food products 
Chemicals and allied 
products 
Primary and fabricated 
metals 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Other 
All manufacturing 
Average of  industry 
Total Assets per Employee 
28.27  20.17  14.44  21.62  17.42  13.26 
35.95  37.77  20.46  29.94  28.27  17.27 
33.71  21.31  -  26.11  21.33  - 
24.25  18.02  12.08  16.28  13.54  12.26 
30.01  19.07  -  22.04  17.30  - 
29.69  21.26  16.31  23.75  15.99  13.94 
Total Assets per Employee 
(Parent Ratio = 100) 
100.0  70.9  55.2  100.0  76.6  66.8 
100.0  74.8  53.0  100.0  80.4  63.6 
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment per Employee 
11.17  7.72  4.18  8.33  6.55  4.68 
17.67  17.37  8.28  14.78  13.24  7.33 
18.28  7.52  -  13.04  7.79  - 
-  5.75  6.97  - 
9.86  5.84  3.60  6.38  4.52  3.51 
8.09  7.78 
13.12  8.05  7.24  9.62  6.55  6.15 
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment per Employee 
(Parent Ratio = 100) 
100.0  67.2  50.3  100.0  78.6  66.3 
relativesb  100.0  72.3  44.1  100.0  81.9  60.5  - 
SOURCE:  United States Department of  Commerce (1972). 
”Includes only those parents reporting in 1970. 
bWeighted by parent employment in each industry. 225  Do Multinational Firms Adapt Factor Proportions to Factor Prices? 
tries,  discussed  earlier.  Adaptation within  industries is shown  in  the 
individual industry rows of table 6.2 and summarized in the “average of 
industry relatives” rows. It is calculated by putting each industry row into 
relative form (parent capital intensity = 100) and averaging across indus- 
tries with parent employment as weights. If  within-industry adaptation 
were the only type that took place, the “all manufacturing” entries and 
the “average of  industry relatives”  entries would be identical. If  there 
were, in addition, some selection by choice of industries, in the sense that 
labor-intensive industries had a larger share of overseas activity than of 
home country activity, it would tend to make the “all manufacturing” 
relatives lower than the “average of industry relatives.” Such selection 
does appear to have taken place in the case of  affiliates in developed 
countries.  Labor-intensive industries are more important  than  in  the 
home countries.  However, the opposite seems to be true for less de- 
veloped countries. The industry selection seems to lean toward capital- 
intensive industries there and offsets, to a small degree, the effect of 
adaptation within industries. Thus, not only does selection of  industries 
play a small role in the total extent of adaptation for manufacturing as a 
whole, but it even plays a role apparently opposite to that of labor cost in 
LDCs, for reasons suggested earlier. The major adaptation to labor costs 
takes place within these broad industries. 
The  Swedish data in table 6.3  point to roughly the same  conclusions. In 
the overwhelming  majority of  cases the capital intensities in Swedish 
industries were higher than those in developed country affiliates (fifteen 
out of seventeen) and those in LDC affiliates (nine out of eleven). The 
capital intensities in Swedish parent companies were higher than those in 
developed country affiliates in fifteen out of eighteen cases and higher 
than those of LDC  affiliates in all twelve comparisons we could make. By 
far the largest part of  the difference in capital intensity between com- 
panies in Sweden and foreign affiliates in developed countries and be- 
tween affiliates in developed countries and those in LDCs is accounted 
for by  differences  within  broad industries.  Comparing the aggregate 
ratios with the averages of industry ratios for fire insurance values, we 
find for LDCs that the aggregate is a bit lower, indicating some selection 
of  labor-intensive industries  for  production  in  LDCs. However, the 
effects of  that selection were  again,  as in  the United States, minor 
compared with the use in LDCs of relatively labor-intensive production 
methods within industries. 
We conclude from these aggregate data that the large differences in 
capital  intensity,  especially  between  LDCs and  the  DC affiliates  of 
United States and Swedish companies and between  DC affiliate  and 
parent or home country capital intensity, are not primarily expressions of 
industry mix, at least among the broadly defined manufacturing indus- 
tries we consider, but reflect differences within industries. Table 6.3  Capital Intensity (Capital per Employee) in Manufacturing Industry Groups, Swedish Domestic Industry, 
Parent Companies, and Foreign Amliates (Unit: Thousand Kronor per Employee) 
1970  1974 
Affiliates in  Affiliates in 
Manufacturing  Swedish  Parent  Developed  Swedish  Parent  Developed 
Industry Group  Industry  Companies  Countries  LDCs  Industry  Companies  Countries  LDCs 
Fire Insurance Value of  Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment per Employee 
Food, drink, and tobacco  108.6  142.4  76.6  -  186.6d  252.6  120.4  - 
Textiles and apparel  57.8'  62.7  12.2  -  91.7d  114.8  16.5  - 
Pulp, paper, and printing  182.2  n.a.  108.1  71.0  338.1  325.4  193.7  110.6 
Pulp and paper  341.6d  234.2  156.7  -  589.4d  365.0  233.1  - 
Paper products and printing  73.2d  118.0  66.0  71  .O  109.3d  125.8  137.7  110.6 
Chemicals and plastics  164.0'  94.0  31.9  258.4d  165.3  170.7  95.1 
65.7d  117.1  67.1  35.2  113.6d  172.1  88.3  36.7 
48.3  27.4  118.3  128.5  57.7  35.9 
Metal productsa 
Machinery 
Nonelectrical  82.7d  106.7  54.7  28.6  122.2d  125.2  71.6  17.7 
Electrical  77.6d  78.0  29.8  24.1  100.ld  130.9  40.0  32.4 
Transport equipment'  107.9d  108.6  43.7  22.5  139.8d  128.8  126.8  51.6 
100.3  [  92.6 
Fire Insurance  Value of  Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment per Employee 
(Swedish ratio = 100) 
All manufacturing  100.0  53.6  26.2  100.0  47.5  24.7 
Average of  industry relativesb  100.0  55.6  32.6  100.0  52.6  31.9 
SOURCES:  For industries, Sweden, Statistiska Centralbyrin (1972a, b, 1976a, b), except as indicated. For companies, directly from Industriens Utred- 
ningsinstitut. 
"Published industry figures include primary  metals,  excluded from company data. This is a very capital-intensive  industry and tends to distort the 
comparisons. We have therefore used the figure for metal products alone, from the Industriens Utredningsinstitut. 
bWeighted by industry employment. 
'Including rubber products. 
dEstimates from Industriens Utredningsinstitut. 
'Excluding rubber products. 
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6.4  Measures of the Price of Labor and Capital Intensity 
The theoretical determinant of  capital-intensity decisions, if  scale of 
production is not a factor, is the relative prices of  labor and capital. In 
examining factor choices within the firm we have assumed that the prices 
of capital are identical for the firm in all locations, and that ratios of  the 
price of labor to  the price of capital are therefore proportional to the price 
of  labor (wage rates) alone. The price of  capital may be considered to 
consist of two elements, one the opportunity cost to the firm of tying up 
assets in a particular form, and the other the price of  a physical capital 
good. If there were no restrictions on transferring profits or repatriating 
capital, and if risks and tax rates were the same among countries, capital 
costs in the first sense could be taken to be the same for a given firm all 
over the world. That might not be a bad assumption for comparisons 
among developed countries.  In  at least some developing countries it 
would be far from accurate, and in extreme cases restrictions on repatria- 
tion might make capital for reinvestment almost free to an affiliate. Such 
circumstances would tend  to produce  high capital intensities in  low- 
income countries and limit or obscure adaptation to factor prices. 
With respect to physical capital, the assumption of  equal prices in all 
countries is clearly not valid. This is particularly true for construction 
costs, which are strongly affected by wage or real income levels. It is not 
quite such a bad assumption for equipment, which tends to have more of 
a world market. Price indexes for construction costs in 1970, relative to 
those in the United States, ranged from 37 and 26 percent in the poorest 
and next-poorest group of  countries to 62 percent in the highest-income 
countries, while those for producer durables ranged from 91 percent in 
the middle group of  countries up to 106 percent in the poorest group 
(Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1978a, p. 120). Thus the price rela- 
tionships for the two groups have somewhat offsetting effects. 
The high level of  producer durable prices in low-income countries 
reflects, to some extent, the degree of protection to domestic production 
of these products. The effective protection rates vary widely, but quite a 
few are over 100 percent.* 
It would be desirable to take account of  these differences in capital 
costs if  the price comparisons were available. Since construction costs and 
wage rates are positively correlated, we exaggerate the differences be- 
tween countries in relative factor prices and underestimate elasticities of 
substitution by using wage rates alone to measure factor price ratios. 
The price of  labor we  would like to measure is that for completely 
unskilled labor or for labor of  a given quality. Lacking any such price 
measure, we have used several approximations, or  proxies. These include 
real GDP  per capita, the average wage paid by all United States manufac- 
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affiliate, and the latter two deflated by an index of the average quality of 
labor. 
Real GDP  per capita is of course not a measure of the price of labor. It 
was used as a proxy under the assumption that the higher the real GDP 
per capita, the higher the standard of  living and the higher the cost of 
unskilled  labor. The estimates, which  are from  Kravis,  Heston, and 
Summers (1978b), are based on data from the United Nations Interna- 
tional Comparison Project and are not subject to the usual problems of 
comparisons via  exchange rates (see Kravis,  Kenessey,  Heston, and 
Summers 1975; Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1978a). 
Average wages, converted into dollars at current exchange rates, come 
closer  to measures of  the price  of  labor, but  they  obviously  reflect 
differences in quality as well as differences in price. To remove the effect 
of  quality differences, we have devised a rough index of  labor quality for 
about fifty countries from various measures calculated by others, includ- 
ing Denison (1967), Harbison and Myers (1964), and Krueger (1968). In 
using the quality index to  deflate money wages for a specific industry, for 
example, we in effect assume that each company within a country hires 
workers of  average quality and that any deviation of  a company’s wage or 
an industry’s wage from the average wage represents a higher cost rather 
than higher quality. Where we use average country wages without dis- 
tinguishing companies or industries, however, we are making a very 
different assumption-namely  , that all companies and industries in a 
country face the same price of labor and that any variation in average 
wages among companies or industries represents differences in quality. 
Measures of capital intensity raise at least as many problems. We have 
experimented with assets per worker, book and replacement values of 
property, plant, and equipment per worker, value added, and nonwage 
value added per worker. Assets per worker have the advantage of being 
comprehensive. If one thinks of inventories, bank accounts, and loans as 
being  production  inputs,  that  comprehensiveness  seems  desirable. 
However, there is no assurance that the financial assets of a subsidiary are 
held entirely to assist production in that subsidiary’s host country. It is 
quite conceivable that a parent company might  arrange to have the 
subsidiary hold assets for the use of  the parent or of other affiliates, and it 
would  then be improper to treat those financial  assets as necessarily 
contributing to host country output. Similarly, the parent might hold 
financial assets for the use of  all its affiliates, in which case we might be 
understating the amount of capital involved in a given affiliate’s produc- 
tion. 
We have, for these reasons, leaned toward fixed assets, or property, 
plant, and equipment per worker. Most of the data are for net property, 
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rates, valuation of  assets purchased in the past, and so on. However, for 
Swedish affiliates and their parents and for Swedish domestic firms in 
each industry we also have data on the valuation of gross property, plant, 
and equipment for fire insurance, which should come closer to current 
replacement cost. 
It would be desirable to have a measure of  the flow of capital services 
instead  of  the stock of  capital,  since that would  be  the appropriate 
measure of  the contribution of  capital to production. We do not have 
adequate measures, however, and the proxies that have been suggested, 
such as value added or nonwage value added per worker (see, for exam- 
ple, Lary  1968), do not seem satisfactory, especially for comparisons 
within firms. The problem centers on the ability of the firm to manipulate 
the location of  profits, presumably to minimize taxes or to evade other 
host country or home country regulations. The result is that there are 
large numbers of affiliates  with negative or  zero value added and others in 
which value added has been inflated for similar reasons. To the extent 
that companies kept subsidiary books in local currencies and translated 
into dollars or kronor via current exchange rates in answering question- 
naires, there may be a bias from under- or overvaluation of  currencies 
that enters the value of  capital (part of  the dependent variable) and the 
wage rate (one of the independent variables) in the same direction. As a 
check on such bias we have run equations using real GDP per capita as a 
wage-cost proxy, since that measure, while it may be subject to error as a 
wage proxy,  is free of  currency translation  bias because it  does not 
depend on exchange rate conversions. 
We should have liked to investigate differences in skill mix and prices 
of skilled labor, but the data are poor for this purpose. The United States 
survey forms included questions on the breakdown of the labor force and 
payrolls by type of  worker, but the answers were considered unsatisfac- 
tory by  BEA and were not used. We could not treat differences among 
countries in average wages as representing skill differences, as one might 
within a country. The average wage of each country, deflated by average 
labor quality, is our measure of the price of standard labor, though it can 
incorporate skill differences as well.  To the extent that it  does, the 
relationship between the price of labor and capital intensity is bl~rred.~ 
The Swedish affiliate data did include a usable distinction between 
production workers and others. We have made some use of the propor- 
tion of nonproduction workers as a measure of skill intensity. It is a crude 
measure, but the fact that nonproduction workers have higher earnings 
per worker than the production workers suggests that they are of higher 
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6.5  Labor Costs and Factor Proportions 
in Individual Countries and Industries 
We begin our analysis of  the effect of  labor costs on capital intensity 
with a series of regressions across countries, using data on the characteris- 
tics of  United States and Swedish multinationals’ affiliates in  different 
countries. 
In the first set of  regressions, summarized in table 6.4, each observa- 
tion is for the sum of all United States-owned manufacturing affiliates in 
a country. The equations, which are in double-log form, show that capital 
intensity responds  significantly to country differences in  the price of 
labor. Equations 5 and 6, which make use of what we consider our best 
measures of  the price of labor (the average affiliate wage divided by our 
measure of  average labor quality in  each country, described earlier), 
show strongly significant coefficients for the price of  labor of  about 0.7 
(with property, plant, and equipment as the capital measure) and 0.8 (for 
all capital). If  we assume that the production functions are CES and that 
capital costs do not differ among countries, these coefficients are mea- 
sures of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Compar- 
ing equations 1 and 2 with equations 3 and 4 indicates that adding more 
countries to the thirty-eight covered by  our labor quality index would 
tend to raise the coefficients, their significance, and the?  but would not 
change the main findings. 
Real GDP per capita, which we expected to be a good proxy for the 
price of labor, performed poorly, explaining very little of the variation in 
capital intensity. To check whether the greater explanatory power of the 
wage rates might be spurious, stemming from a common price level effect 
on both wage rates and the capital intensity measure, we ran equations 7 
and 8 with price level as the explanatory variable. Price level had no 
apparent explanatory power, and the coefficients were not statistically 
significant. However, the fact that the coefficients  were positive and fairly 
large  does raise  the  possibility that  the elasticity of  substitution we 
calculate may be somewhat exaggerated by  spurious price effects. 
The Swedish data of table 6.5, like the United States data, show strong 
effects of  wage levels on capital intensity. The coefficients for average 
wage and for quality-adjusted average wage range from 0.75 to 0.87, 
somewhat above those in the United States equations. What is different 
about the Swedish results is that both price level and real GDP  are related 
to capital intensity. The high price level coefficient hints at some exag- 
geration of  the calculated substitution elasticities, but the considerable 
explanatory  power  of  real  GDP, the labor  price proxy most  clearly 
cleansed of  price effects, shows that the price of labor is an influential 
factor. 
The results  summarized in  tables  6.4 and 6.5 indicate that  factor 
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We ask next whether the response involves only the choice of  industries 
for investment (labor-intensive industries in low-wage countries) or in- 
cludes choices among companies or production methods within indus- 
tries. We can get some notion of  the answer to this question from tables 
Table 6.4  Relation of Capital Intensity of Production 
to the Price of  Labor, United States-Owned  Affiliates, 
by Country (All Manufacturing Combined, 1966) 
In -  =a+blnw  t  1 
Number 
of 
Observa- 
Equa-  tions  Capital  Coefficients 
tion  (Coun-  Intensity  Labor Price  Labor  Constant 
NumbeP  tries)b  Measure  Measure  Price'  Term  P2 
ld 
2d 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
66 
66 
38 
38 
38 
38 
38 
38 
PPE 
Assets 
PPE 
Assets 
PPE 
Assets 
PPE 
Assets 
Average affiliate wage 
Average affiliate wage 
Average affiliate wage 
Average affiliate wage 
Average affiliate wage 
Average quality 
Average affiliate wage 
Average quality 
Price level 
Price level 
0.72 
0.68 
0.60 
(2.80) 
0.62 
(3.26) 
0.73 
(3.10) 
0.79 
(3.84) 
.26 
(.76) 
.31 
(1.01) 
(4.73) 
(5.55) 
2.97 
(2.55) 
4.28 
3.96 
(2.38) 
4.76 
(3.21) 
6.29 
(8.31) 
7.07 
(10.73) 
7.57 
8.32 
(6.62) 
(4.53) 
(5.49) 
.25 
.31 
.16 
.21 
.19 
.27 
.oo 
.oo 
NOTE: 
PPE = Gross property, plant, and equipment per worker, in $ thousand. 
Assets = Total assets per worker, in $ thousand. 
Average affiliate wage = Average wage in United States manufacturing affiliates. 
Average quality = Index of  average quality of  the labor force. 
Price level = Money GDP, translated into dollars by exchange rate, divided by real GDP. 
"Each equation is in double-log form, with capital intensity as the dependent variable and 
the price of  labor as the independent variable. 
bEach observation is for all affiliates of United States manufacturing companies in a foreign 
country. 
'Assuming  the  production  function  is CES and that capital  costs  do not  differ  across 
countries for an individual firm, this coefficient is a measure of  the elasticity of substitution. 
dEquations 1 and 2 are based  on all  observations  for which average  affiliate wage is 
available. The  other equations are confined to countries for which the labor quality measure 
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Table 6.5  Relation of  Capital Intensity of Production" 
to the Price of Labor, Swedish-Owned Affiliates, 
by Country (All Manufacturing Combined, 1970 and 1974) 
In -  =a+blnw  iLKJ 
Number 
of 
Observa- 
Equa-  tions 
tion  (Coun- 
Numberh  tries)'  Year 
1  27  1970 
2  25  1974 
3  27  1970 
Labor Price 
Measure or Proxy 
Average affiliate waged 
Average affiliate waged 
Average waged 
Average quality 
Coefficients 
Labor 
Price 
0.75 
(3.29) 
0.80 
(2.53) 
0.84 
(3.22) 
Constant 
Term  fZ 
1.16  .27 
1.31  .18 
(1.41) 
(1.12) 
4.69  .27 
(6.71) 
0.85  5.05  .15 
1974  Average waged  4  25 
Average quality  (2.30)  (13.82) 
5  28  1970  Real GDP  0.46 
(3.71) 
6  26  1974  Real GDP  0.49 
(3.07) 
7  28  1970  Price level  0.89 
(2.92) 
8  26  1974  Price level  0.98 
(2.87) 
2.23  .32 
2.40  .25 
0.18  .22 
(0.14) 
0.14  .22 
(0.10) 
(4.98) 
(3.94) 
NOTE:  For definitions of  labor price measure see table 6.4. 
'Fire  insurance value of  property, plant, and equipment per worker. 
hEach  equation is in double-log form, with capital intensity as the dependent variable and 
the price of  labor as the independent variable. 
'Each observation is for all affiliates of Swedish manufacturing companies in a country other 
than Sweden. 
dAverage  wages in United States affiliates. 
6.6 and 6.7, which show the same relationships within broad industry 
groups for both United States and Swedish affiliates. 
The United States equations for aggregate manufacturing (table 6.4) 
and for pooled individual industries (table 6.6) are very similar, except 
that the latter imply lower elasticities of substitution, 0.50-0.55 instead of 
0.6-0.7. In other words, the substitution between labor and capital in the 
manufacturing  aggregates of  table  6.4 owes a little to the choice of 
industries but mostly takes place within the broad industry groupings 
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to be more heavily represented in lower-income countries, in contrast to 
our earlier results from treating all LDCs as a group, but it accounts for 
only a small part of  the apparent substitution of labor for capital there. 
The equations for individual United States industries almost all show 
significant labor price coefficients, implying substitution of  labor  for 
capital in low-wage countries. The exception was transport equipment, 
for which the number of  observations was very small. The largest coef- 
ficient, suggesting an elasticity of  substitution above one, was for the 
chemicals industry. 
In every industry, whether property, plant, and equipment or total 
assets was used as the capital measure, the response to differences in 
wages adjusted for labor quality was somewhat stronger than that to the 
unadjusted wage differences. The same was true in the pooled industry 
data, as can be seen in the comparison between equation 2 and equation 
3. The higher coefficients  for quality-adjusted wage levels are apparently 
not simply a characteristic of the smaller group of countries for which we 
have the labor quality data; these countries and the whole set produce 
almost identical equations, as can be seen by comparing equations 1 
and 2. 
A similar analysis of  Swedish affiliates is made in table 6.7. Since we 
had no wage data by country for Swedish affiliates, the elasticities were 
estimated using average wages paid in each country by  United States 
affiliates: the same wage variable as in tables 6.4  and 6.5. Both 1970 and 
1974 equations indicated strong response to labor prices, as measured by 
average wages or by quality-deflated average wages, and the degree of 
response was virtually the same as in the corresponding country aggre- 
gates of table 6.5. Industry mix, in other words, contributed very little, if 
anything, to the appearance of  response to wage differences. Both real 
GDP and price level were also related to capital intensity and, in fact, 
explained  it  better than  did the presumably more  appropriate wage 
variable. 
Although there were not enough observations to calculate an equation 
for each industry among Swedish affiliates, there did seem to be some 
industry differences large enough to affect the elasticity measure. When 
we  distinguished two  industries,  which  seemed to be  outliers, paper 
products and printing and metal products, from the others, we found 
them to have somewhat higher capital intensities, and the explanatory 
power of  the equation increased greatly. 
On the whole, the Swedish affiliates appeared to respond to prices of 
labor as the United States affiliates did, and perhaps to a greater degree, 
with elasticities of  substitution mainly over 0.7. Little of  this apparent 
response  in  either  country  is  attributable  to  selection of  industries. 
Almost all the response took  place within industries. Table 6.6  Relation of Capital Intensity of Production to the Price of Labor, United States Affiliates Aggregated 
by  Industry Group within Each Country (Five Industry Groups, Separately and Pooled, 1966) 
In -  =a+blnw  iei 
Equation  Industry 
NumbeP  Grouu 
Number 
of  Capital 
Observa-  Intensity  Labor Price 
tionsb  Measure  Measure' 
Coefficients 
Labor  Constant 
Price  Term  iz 
1 
2 
All manufacturing indus-  179 
128' 
try groups, pooled 
PPEd 
PPEd 
~ 
Average wage 
Average wage 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Food manufacturing 
Chemicals 
128 
45 
31 
45 
31 
52 
33 
PPEd 
PPE 
PPE 
Assets 
Assets 
PPE 
PPE 
Average wage 
Average quality 
Average wage 
Average wage 
Average quality 
Average wage 
Average wage 
Average quality 
Average wage 
Average wage 
0.50 
0.51 
(4.30) 
0.55 
(4.18) 
0.40 
(3.66) 
0.56 
0.53 
(5.17) 
0.61 
1.07 
(4.70) 
1.20 
(4.97) 
(4.35) 
(5.57) 
(3.60) 
-5.28 
(6.82) 
(5.76) 
-5.32 
-3.12 
(7.36) 
5.33 
(6.48) 
6.68 
(16.70) 
5.21 
(6.70) 
7.45 
(21.78) 
0.26 
(0.14) 
4.80 
(4.31) 
.12 
.12 
.ll 
.22 
.37 
.37 
.50 
.29 
.27 
Average quality 10  52  Assets  Average wage  0.73 
(5.02) 
0.78 
(3.25) 
0.54 
(1.91) 
0.81 
(1.96) 
0.55 
(2.73) 
0.66 
0.49 
(3.80) 
0.51 
(2.82) 
0.56 
(5.65) 
0.62 
(4.42) 
0.44 
(2.20) 
(1.12) 
0.64 
(1.33) 
4.06 
(3.56) 
7.24 
(9.01) 
4.45 
(1.99) 
5.97 
5.40 
(4.34) 
(3.43) 
7.49 
(7.50) 
4.22 
(4.27) 
6.42 
(1  1.18) 
5.02 
(6.64) 
7.40 
(16.71) 
4.71 
(1.51) 
6.12 
(3.82) 
.32 
Average wage  .23 
.09 
11 
12 
33 
29 
Assets 
PPE 
Average quality 
Average wage  Metals 
Average wage 
Average quality 
Average wage 
13 
14 
23 
29 
PPE 
Assets 
.11 
.19 
Average wage  .15 
.27 
15 
16 
23 
38 
Assets 
PPE 
Average quality 
Average wage  Machinery 
Average wage 
Average quality 
Average wage 
17 
18 
28 
38 
PPE 
Assets 
.20 
.46 
Average wage 
28 
Transport equipment  15 
.41 
.02 
19 
20 
Assets 
PPE 
Average quality 
Average wage 
Average wage 
Average quality 
.06  21  13  PPE Table 6.6 (continued) 
Equation  Industry 
NumbeP  Grouo 
Number 
of  Capital 
Observa-  Intensity  Labor Price 
tionsb  Measure  Measure' 
Coefficients 
Labor  Constant 
Price  Term  i2 
22  15  Assets  Average wage 
~~ 
0.30  7.10  .03 
(1.20)  (3.57) 
23  13  Assets  0.40  8.15  .06 
Average wage 
Average quality  (1.32)  (7.91) 
"Each equation is in double-log form with capital intensity as the dependent variable and the price of  labor as the independent variable. 
bEach observation is the sum of  all United States affiliates in an industry group in a country. 
'Average  wage paid by all United States-owned affiliates in an industry in a country. 
pooled equations the capital intensity (gross property, plant, and equipment per worker) of United States affiliates is taken as a percentage of the capital 
intensity in the corresponding United States industry. 
'Equation 2 is the same as equation 1  but is run only over those countries for which labor quality data are available. Thus equation2 is comparable in country 
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6.6  Labor Costs and Factor Proportions within United States Firms 
The next question we address is whether the degree of  adaptation we 
have found to  exist within industries might be a matter of  selection, either 
among subindustries or  among companies within each industry, with each 
company producing in the same way at home and abroad and in each 
foreign location. We cannot work with much finer industry classifications 
than those  of  table  6.6, for lack  of  data or of  sufficient numbers of 
observations, but we can, for both the United States and Sweden, use 
information for individual companies and  their  affiliates to look  for 
adaptation within companies. The within-company adaptation might be 
within a given technology (fig. 6. 1)7  between technologies (fig.6.2), some 
combination of  these (fig.6.3), or some selection of processes for LDC 
production. In addition, the capital/labor ratio may reflect the effects of 
scale economies or diseconomies within the firm (fig.6.4). 
Table 6.7  Relation of  Capital Intensity of Production' 
to the Price of Labor, Swedish Affiliates Aggregated by Country 
within Industry (Manufacturing Industries, Pooled, 1970 and 1974) 
In -  =a+bD+clnw  i:) 
Coefficients 
Equa-  Labor  Dummy  Number 
tion  Labor  Price  Con-  Variable  of 
Num-  Price  or  stant  for two  Obser-  - 
ber  Year  Measure  Proxv  Term  Industriesb  vations  R2 
1  1970  Average wage'  .68  -3.44  .61  106  .25 
(3.83)  (5.25)  (4.19) 
(3.79)  (4.92)  (3.95) 
quality  (3.54)  (6.67)  (4.25) 
quality  (3.25)  (5.58)  (3.91) 
(4.69)  (7.18)  (4.45) 
(4.95)  (6.94)  (4.15) 
(4.34)  (5.40)  (4.36) 
(4.64)  (5.58)  (3.92) 
2  1974  Average wage  .77  -3.75  .58  96  .22 
3  1970  Average wage'/  .74  -1.95  .62  106  .24 
4  1974  Average wage'/  .79  -2.02  .58  96  .19 
5  1970  Real GDP  .45  -2.64  .62  108  .30 
6  1974  Real GDP  .53  -2.95  .56  100  .28 
7  1970  Price level  .91  -4.77  .62  108  .28 
8  1974  Price level  1  .OO  -5.13  .54  100  .27 
"Fire-insurance value of property, plant, and equipment per worker relative to that of the 
same industry in Sweden. 
bPaper products and metal products. 
'Average  wage in manufacturing affiliates of  United States companies. 238  Robert E. Lipsey/Irving B. KravidRornualdo A. Roldan 
A sampling of United States results for all industries in 1966 and 1970 is 
given in table 6.8. Since we are using individual affiliates as the units of 
observation here, we can include, in addition to the price of labor in the 
host country, the scale of operations for the affiliate itself as an explana- 
tory variable. 
The data for 1966 have some advantages and some drawbacks com- 
pared with those from the 1970 survey. The main advantage is that they 
are from a complete census of foreign direct investment, and the number 
of  observations is therefore much greater. Second, the 1966 question- 
naire was much more detailed than the later one, a fact that permits us to 
measure more  and different variables.  On the other hand, the 1966 
census did not include as much parent data as in 1970. Therefore the 
capital-intensity variables for 1966 could not be calculated relative to 
those of  parents because we  lack parent data. The result is that some 
selection of  parents may be mixed in with the adaptation by individual 
companies. 
The wage level coefficients  in equations 2 and 3 are close to, but a little 
smaller than, those of  table 6.6 where we  used country aggregates of 
affiliates. We can therefore say that most of  the response to wage level 
within industries takes place within individual companies, but there is 
also a tendency for firms with low capital intensity to operate in low-wage 
countries, reinforcing the effects of  intrafirm adaptation. 
The scale variable proves to be highly significant and in the expected 
direction for capital intensity as measured by physical plant and equip- 
ment.  That is,  larger  scale is  associated with  more  capital-intensive 
methods of production. But this was not true where capital intensity was 
measured by total assets per worker (equations 7, 8, and 9). By  that 
measure, larger size had  no relation, or even a negative relation, to 
capital intensity. 
The measure of the price of labor used here (except in equations 3,6, 
and 9) is different for each affiliate. It is the affiliate’s average wage per 
worker or average wage deflated by  the average labor quality of  the 
country in which the affiliate is located. Use of the individual firm average 
wage as a measure of  the price of  labor implies that, within a country, 
higher wages represent a higher price for standard labor rather than 
higher labor quality. If  this is not the case (if internal labor markets are 
competitive, for example) the price of labor might be better measured by 
the average manufacturing affiliate wage for the country as a whole. 
Equations 3, 6, and 9 of table 6.8 use this wage level measure, but the 
results are not consistently higher or lower labor price coefficients than 
those of the equations using the affiliate wage levels. 
The pooling of observations from all industries implies that labor price 
and scale effects are identical among them, an assumption in which we 
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manufacturing industries are given in table 6.9 and 6.10, the former 
showing those for the price of  labor  and the latter those for scale of 
production, for both 1966 and 1970. The equations for 1966 differ from 
those for 1970 in several respects. As mentioned earlier, affiliate capital 
intensity is not calculated relative to that of the parent for 1966, and we 
have omitted the equations for net property, plant, and equipment per 
worker because they are similar to those for gross PPE but show slightly 
lower elasticities and R2s. 
Within industries, physical capital intensity is clearly responsive to 
differences in the price of labor (table 6.9). The variable is significant in 
eleven out of fourteen equations for 1970 and twelve out of fourteen for 
1966, not counting groups such as chemicals for which we also have 
subgroup equations. The mean and median of  the statistically significant 
wage level coefficients is 0.45 for 1970, when each affiliate is compared 
with its parent, and 0.50 for 1966, both a little lower than the coefficient of 
0.55  from  the  country  aggregates  for  the  same  year  in  table  6.6. 
Apparently, most all of  the response to wage level differences we have 
observed takes place within, rather than between, individual firms. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in view  of  the doubts we expressed earlier 
about assets as a capital measure for individual affiliates, we are able to 
explain variation  in total capital per worker  better than variation in 
physical capital per worker. The levels of  the R2 and the average labor 
price coefficients are substantially above those for physical capital. The 
coefficients are higher than those in the equations of  table 6.8 using 
pooled industry data. Apparently industries with affiliates having high 
total assets per worker  tend to locate in low-wage countries. Such a 
selection of  industries would run counter to what we would expect from 
adaptation to wage levels through selection of industries, and it therefore 
implies that  industry  selection is  not  the reason  for the labor price 
response we observe. 
Scale is significant in only three of  the fourteen individual industry 
equations, excluding duplicated groups, for 1970, when capital intensity 
was measured by net PPE assets. However, the coefficient is positive, as 
expected, where it is significant (table 6.10). For 1966, with many more 
observations,  a gross PPE measure, but no comparison with parents, 
scale was significant in eight of the industries. The absence of scale effects 
in many industries, particularly for 1970 when capital intensity was mea- 
sured relative to parents, suggests that in the pooled data of table 6.8 we 
might have been observing an interindustry effect rather than a true 
effect of  scale on capital intensity within industries. That is, industries 
with small-scale operations tended to have affiliates that were labor- 
intensive relative to their parents, but within most industries there was 
little relation between scale and capital intensity of  individual affiliates. 
That possibility of industry effects is also suggested by the fact that two of Table 6.8  Relation of Capital Intensity of Production to the Price of Labor: Individual United States Affiliates 
(All Manufacturing Industries, Pooled, 1966 and 1970) 
In -  =a+bInw+cInNS  (:I 
Number of  Capital 
Equation  Observations  Intensity  Labor Price 
Numbern  Year  (Affiliates)  Measureb  Measure 
Coefficients 
Labor  - 
Price  Scale'  Constant  R2 
1  1966  4,502  Gross PPEd  Average affiliate wage  0.44  0.13 
(14.29)  (11.54) 
2  1966  4,336'  Gross PPE  0.47  0.14 
Average quality  (13.18)  (12.27) 
Average affiliate wage 
3  1966  4,336  Gross PPE  0.34  0.15 
4  1970  2,305  Net PPE"  Average affiliate wage  0.45  0.08 
Average country wage 
Average quality  (7.96)  (13.06) 
(9.89)  (4.53) 
8.88  .08 
(98.51) 
-9.73  .08 
(101.40) 
-9.62  .06 
(96.18) 
(14.30) 
-2.18  .06 5 
6 
1970  2,256 
1970  2,213 
Net PPE 
Net PPE 
Average affiliate wage 
Average quality 
Average country wage 
Average quality 
0.45  0.09  -2.23  .06 
(8.98)  (4.86)  (14.20) 
0.62  0.09  -2.55  .06 
(9.20)  (5.12)  (15.15) 
1970  2,315  Assets'  Average affiliate wage  0.60  -  0.02  -1.11  .15  7 
(20.05)  (1.95)  (1  1.28) 
Average quality  (18.38)  (1.39)  (  1  1.47) 
1970  2,266  Assets  0.60  -0.02  -1.17  .13  Average affiliate wage 
8 
9  1970  2,223  Assets  0.59  0.00  -1.37  .07  Average country wage 
Average quality  (13.08)  (0.27)  (12.12) 
"Each equation is in double-log form with capital intensity as the dependent variable and labor price as the independent variable. 
bGross  PPE = Gross property, plant, and equipment per worker. 
Net PPE 
Assets  = Assets per worker. 
'Scale  (SC) = Net sales of  affiliate (total sales less imports from the United States). 
dAffiliate relative to United States industry. 
"Affiliate relative to parent. 
'Equation 2 is the same as equation 1  but is run only over those countries for which labor quality data are available. Thus equation 2 is comparable in country 
coverage to equation 3. 
= Net property, plant and equipment per worker. 242  Robert E. Lipsey/Irving B. KravidRomualdo A. Roldan 
Table 6.9  Coefficients for Labor Price in Equations 
Relating Physical and Total Capital Intensity 
to the Price of Labor"  and Scale of Productionb 
(Individual United States Affiliates, by  Industry, 1966 and 1970) 
=a+bInw+cInNS 
Industrv 
Coefficients in Equations for 
Physical Capital  Total Capital 
Intensity'  Intensityd 
1970  1966  1970  1966 
Food processing 
Paper and allied products 
Chemicals 
Drugs 
Other chemicals 
Rubber and plastics 
Primary and fabricated metals 
Non-electrical machinery 
Computers and office machinery 
Other nonelectrical machinery 
Radio, television, and electronics 
Household appliances 
Other electrical machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Other transport equipment  - 
Electrical machinery 
Transport equipment 
0.45 
0.44 
0.55 
0.41 
0.58 
0.19' 
0.44 
0.52 
1.04 
0.32 
0.54 
0.47 
1.28 
0.33' 
0.54 
0.59 
'0.43' 
Other manufacturing  0.38 
"Average wage per worker in each affiliate, deflated by average labor quality in the country 
in which the affiliate is located. 
bNet sales of an affiliate (total sales less imports from the United States). 
'For  1970, affiliate net property, plant,  and equipment per worker relative to the same 
measure for the parent company; for 1966, affiliate gross property, plant, and equipment 
per worker. 
dFor 1970, affiliate total assets per worker relative ro  the same measure for the parent 
company; for 1966, affiliate total assets per worker. 
'Not  significant at the 5 percent level. 
0.53  0.91 
0.70  0.40 
0.67  0.64 
0.29  0.37 
0.75  0.76 
0.50  0.27 
0.45  0.59 
0.39  0.60 
0.70  0.78 
0.25  0.56 
0.57  0.82 
0.70  0.90 
0.41  1.00 
0.47  0.58 
0.28  0.29 
0.22'  0.30' 
0.65'  -0.19' 
0.47  0.49 
0.85 
0.71 
0.78 
0.58 
0.82 
0.68 
0.62 
0.69 
0.78 
0.63 
0.85 
0.92 
0.65 
0.83 
0.67 
0.60 
1.04 
0.81 
the three significant scale effects on physical capital intensity in 1970 are 
for combinations of  industries: other chemicals, and other nonelectrical 
machinery. 
When we did measure capital intensity by total, rather than physical, 
assets per worker, the coefficient for scale, while it is statistically sig- 
nificant in only a minority of cases, is negative in all of  these. That is, the 
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some of the same industries' equations showed that the larger the affili- 
ate, the higher the gross property, plant, and equipment per worker. 
These negative scale coefficients are a surprise. There is virtually no 
relationship between  size of  affiliate and assets per worker in simple 
regressions within industries, and the few significant coefficients are split 
between positive and negative ones. However, there is a strong rela- 
tionship between affiliate size and gross property, plant, and equipment 
per worker, and all the statistically significant coefficients are positive. 
These results suggest that indivisibilities  in machinery and equipment are 
responsible for the relationship with physical capital intensity and that the 
effect of  these is offset in other types of  assets. 
6.7  Labor Costs and Factor Proportions within Swedish Firms 
The data for Swedish firms and their foreign affiliates differ from the 
United States data in several respects. One of the chief advantages of the 
Swedish data is that they give production, by industry, for each parent 
and affiliate. We can thus distinguish industry-mix choices even within 
the firm from choices of  factor proportions within an industry in a way 
that is impossible with the United States data, in which each parent and 
each affiliate is characterized as being in a single industry. We calculate, 
for each Swedish parent and affiliate, capital intensities at Swedish indus- 
try coefficients. Any difference between the capital intensities of parents 
and affiliates at Swedish industry coefficients  then represents a choice of 
industry mix, while the differences between the actual capital intensity of 
an affiliate and its calculated capital intensity at Swedish industry coef- 
ficients represents a choice of production methods or product mix within 
industries. Thus we can calculate the affiliate's capital input at Swedish 
coefficients as 
m  KfW 
AK"" = ,X  Aqi sw 
r=l  qi 
and its labor input at Swedish coefficients as 
where AK,"'"  and AL,"" are affiliate capital and labor inputs at Swedish 
industry coefficients, Aq,  is the affiliate's production in industry i, and 
K,"", L,"", and 4,""  are capital input, labor input, and output in  the 
domestic Swedish industry i. We can similarly calculate parent capital and 
labor inputs at Swedish industry ratios, PK""  and PEW,  and we can 
compare all of these with actual affiliate and parent inputs, AK,  AL,  PK, 
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Table 6.10  Coefficients for Scale Variable in Equations 
Relating Physical and Total Capital Intensity 
to the Price of Labor' and Scale of Productionb 
(Individual United States Affiliates, by  Industry, 1966 and 1970) 
=a+bInw+cInNS 
Industrv 
Coefficients in Equations for 
Physical Capital  Total Capital 
Intensity  Intensityd 
1970  1966  1970  1966 
Food processing 
Paper and allied products 
Chemicals 
Drugs 
Other chemicals 
Rubber and plastics 
Primary and fabricated metals 
Non-electrical machinery 
Computers and office machinery 
Other nonelectrical machinery 
Radio, television, and electronics 
Household appliances 
Other electrical machinery 
Transport equipment 
Motor vehicles 
Other transport equipment 
Electrical machinery 
0.10** 
0.09* 
0.15** 
0.10* 
0.15** 
0.03 
-0.06 
0.12** 
0.02 
0.12** 
-  0.05 
-  0.03 
-0.11 
-0.06 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.04 
0.06** 
0.06* 
0.21** 
0.26** 
0.19** 
0.13** 
0.09** 
0.11** 
0.32** 
0.07** 
0.02 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05* 
0.06** 
-0.08 
-0.10** 
0.02 
0.02 
0.08* 
-  0.00 
-0.01 
-  0.07* 
0.01 
-0.07** 
0.04* 
-  0.11** 
-  0.17** 
-0.08* 
-0.08* 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.06** 
-0.06* 
0.01 
0.03' 
0.00 
-0.04* 
-  0.04** 
-  0.02* 
0.05* 
-  0.02' 
-0.09** 
-0.06** 
-  0.17** 
-0.10** 
-0.04* 
-0.02 
-0.02* 
~~ 
__ 
Other manufacturing  0.08*  0.03*  -0.02  -0.09** 
"Average wage per worker in each affiliate, deflated by average labor quality in the country 
in which the affiliate is located. 
bNet sales of  an affiliate (total sales less imports from the United States). 
%or 1970, affiliate net property, plant,  and equipment  per worker relative to the same 
measure for the parent company; for 1966, affiliate gross property, plant, and equipment 
per worker. 
dFor 1970,  affiliate total assets per worker  relative to the same measure for the parent 
company; for 1966, affiliate total assets per worker. 
** =  1.96. 
*  = 1.00sr<1.96. 
Another advantage of these data is that both numbers and payroll are 
given separately for wage and salaried workers, enabling us to calculate 
average earnings for each. The wage per wage worker, while not stan- 
dardized for quality, may be a little less subject to wide differences in mix 
than the average wage in the United States figures, which lump wage and 
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One way to use the Swedish affiliate data is to compare affiliates in the 
aggregate with their parents and with Swedish industry, taking advantage 
of  the information on industry composition instead of  relying on the 
single-industry designations as in the earlier comparisons of aggregates in 
tables 6.1 and 6.3. For example, we can calculate the average ratios of 
affiliate industry/parent industry capital intensities and skill intensities at 
Swedish industry coefficients in 1974 
A K""  PK""  -1-  AL""  PL"" = 1.06 
where AK"" is the amount of capital, AL"" the number of workers, and 
ALS"" the number of  salaried workers an affiliate would have if  it used 
the Swedish industry ratio of capital, all workers, and salaried workers to 
output and the figures for parents are analogous. 
The actual capital intensities of  the affiliates and parents can be com- 
pared with Swedish and parent levels for the same industries as follows: 
AK AK"" 
Average-/-  AL AL"" = .81 
AK AK"" 
PK I PK"" 
-- 
AL  I ALsw 
Average 
AK IAK"" 
= .79. 
-- 
PLI PL"" 
We can interpret these ratios in the light of the fact that Swedish wages 
were high in comparison with those in affiliates' host countries. Adjusted 
for labor quality or not, Swedish wage levels in  1966 and  1970 were 
higher, by  all our measures of  the price of  labor, than those of  every 
country except the United States and Canada. 
If  we take Swedish capital intensities in parent company industries 
(PKsw/PLsw)  as 100, the capital intensities for aggregates of parents and 
affiliates were: 
Affiliate industry mix relative to parents 
Parent capital intensity relative to all 
Swedish firms in same industries 
106 
PK  PK"" 
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Affiliate capital intensity relative to 
Swedish industry in parent industries 
AK PK"" 
(ALIm)  86 
Affiliate capital intensity was 14 percent below that of  Swedish com- 
panies in the industries of  parents. We can divide that difference into two 
elements. The actual capital intensity of affiliate production was almost 
20 percent below what would have been expected (difference between 
106 and 86), given the industry composition  of  affiliate activities and 
Swedish capital intensity. The 20 percent  could reflect  the degree of 
adaptation by affiliates, within industries, to lower prices of  labor outside 
Sweden.  That lower capital intensity within industries was partly offset by 
the fact that the affiliates were in industries that were 6 percent more 
capital-intensive  than those  of  the affiliates'  parent companies. Thus 
there was no adaptation to wage  level differences in the selection of 
affiliate industry mix as compared with parent company industry mix. 
Furthermore,  parent  companies  tended to be  slightly  more capital- 
intensive than the corresponding Swedish industries, and there was thus 
no indication of  adaptation through selection of labor-intensive parents 
within industries. 
With respect to our indicator of  skill intensity, the only calculation we 
made shows that affiilates are in industries with substantially the same 
skill requirements (as measured by the importance of salaried workers) as 
those of  their parents' industries. 
Using the data for individual affiliates and individual countries, we test 
first for adaptation by  choice of  industry mix. Do affiliates in  labor- 
intensive industries tend to be in low-wage countries? For this purpose we 
related the capital intensity of each affiliate's parent and of each affiliate 
itself, at Swedish factor coefficients  (AK""/AL"" and  PK""/PL""), to 
measures of  wage levels, as in equations (1) through (3). 
AK"" 
(1)  AL"" 
PK"" 
R2 = .oo  In-  = 4.83 + .09 In w, 
Number of  observations = 428 
R2 = .01  In-  = 5.08 + .16* In w, 
Number of  observations = 424  (2)  PL"" 
(2)  PL""  R2 = .02 
PK"" 
In-  = 5.09 + .151nw, 
Number of  observations = 402 
*Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The calculations performed for us on the 
Swedish data did not include (-statistics for the coefficients. 247  Do Multinational Firms Adapt Factor Proportions to Factor Prices? 
w,  is the average wage in all Swedish affiliates in a country, and w,  is the 
average wage in a particular affiliate, both divided by the average quality 
of  labor, estimated from data on the educational level of  the population, 
as described earlier. There is only a very faint tendency for affiliates with 
parents in labor-intensive industries to be in countries where wage levels 
are low. 
Our measure of  adaptation to factor costs within industries by indi- 
vidual firms is the ratio of  affiliate factor proportions to  what they would 
have been if  there had been no adaptation. The factor proportions that 
represent no adaptation within an industry are those of  Swedish parents 
or of  a Swedish industry in the aggregate in each industry. Thus the factor 
input ratios AKswIALSw  and AKpIALP  represent no adaptation to factor 
prices outside Sweden, and we compare the actual factor ratio of  each 
affiliate, AKIAL, with that at Swedish or parent coefficients, in table 
6.11.  When we  use  affiliate  wage,  either adjusted  for average labor 
quality in  each country  as in  equations 3 and  4, or unadjusted, but 
compared with Swedish or parent wages (assuming an industry or com- 
pany hires the same quality of  labor abroad as in Sweden), as in equations 
5 and 6, the labor cost coefficients are statistically significant and range 
between 0.47 and 0.55. However, only a small part of the variation in 
capital intensities is explained. If we substitute average wages in Swedish 
affiliates in a country for the individual affiliate wages, as in equations 1 
and 2, the wage level coefficient rises substantially, to about 0.75. We 
might guess from this change that the apparent variation in the price of 
labor among affiliates within a country may be spurious, representing 
mainly quality differences rather than price differences. 
If we aggregate not only wage levels but also capital intensities within 
host countries, as in table 6.12, the sensitivity to wage level differences is 
much greater. The wage level coefficients are 0.90 or above, and the 
equations explain much more of  the variation in capital intensities, up to 
40 percent. The variation in capital intensities is adjusted for differences 
in industry mix and is the closest we can come to within-industry substitu- 
tion  between  capital  and  labor. If  we  accept  the results  from  these 
country aggregates, we would conclude that Swedish firms respond even 
more strongly to wage level differences than do United States firms. 
Since the Swedish data contain information on aggregate wages, aggre- 
gate salaries, and numbers of  wage and salary workers, we can calculate 
the average  wage  and average  salary  for each  parent,  affiliate,  and 
Swedish  industry.  If  each  group  of  workers  is  assumed  to be  ho- 
mogeneous+learly  a  risky  assumption-we  can  calculate  prices  for 
wages and salary and also amounts  of input (employment) of each group. 
We have calculated a relative price of skilled labor for each affiliate as the 
ratio of  the average salary to the average wage divided by the ratio of 
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Table 6.11  Relation of Physical Capital Intensity to the Rice 
of  Labor (Individual Swedish Affiliates, 1974) 
In -  =a+Inw  (LK) 
Dependent 
(Capital  Labor  Coefficients 
Equation  Intensity)  cost  Labor  Constant  Number of  - 
Number  Variable  Variables  Price  Term  Observations  RZ 
1 
wc  AK  AK"" 
AL  -I-  AL'"  Q, 
-  .74*  .30  334 
2  -  wc  .79*  .31  334 
QC 
.09 
.10 
.48*  -  .02  326  .06  w.7  AK  AK""  -I-  AL AL'"  Q, 
-  3 
.47*  -  .08  326 
.55*  -  .55  353 
.06 
.G9 
.48*  -  SO  349  .08  w, 
WP 
-  6 
NOTE: 
AK  = Fire insurance value of  affiliate plant and equipment. 
AL  = Number of  workers in affiliate. 
AF" = Fire insurance value of  affiliate plant and equipment if affiliate had the same ratio of 
plant and equipment to sales in each industry as Swedish industry. 
AL"" = Number of  workers in affiliate if  affiliate had the same ratio of  employment to sales 
in each industry as Swedish industry. 
AP  = Fire insurance value of  affiliate plant and equipment if affiliate had the same ratio of 
plant and equipment to sales as among Swedish parents in each industry. 
ALP = Number of workers in affiliate if affiliate had the same ratio of workers to sales as 
among Swedish parents in each industry. 
w,  = Average wage in Swedish manufacturing affiliates in a country. 
w,  = Average wage in a Swedish affiliate. 
w,  = Average wage in Sweden in affiliate industries. 
wp  = Average wage in parent firm. 
Qc  = Average quality of labor in a country as estimated from data on education. 
*  = Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
weighted by the affiliate's mix of industries. We thus measure the relative 
price of skill adjusted for industry mix, and the same ratio is aggregated 
over Swedish affiliates to produce country measures of  the relative price 
of  skilled, as compared with unskilled, labor. 
The skill input measure is the ratio of salaried to wage workers, again 
adjusted for the industry composition of the affiliate's output. The skill 
input measure can be related to the relative price of skill across affiliates 
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Table 6.12  Relation of Physical Capital Intensity to the Price 
of Labor (Swedish Affiliates Aggregated by Country, 1974) 
In -  =n+Inw  i:) 
Dependent 
(Capital  Labor  Coefficients 
Equation  Intensity)  cost  Labor  Constant  Number of  - 
Number  Variable  Variable  Price  Term  Observations  RZ 
.94*  .65  30  .41 
wc 
1  zip  Q, 
-  .95*  .55  30  .41  wc  2 
1.04'  -.37  35  .40 
wc 
ws 
.95*  -.20  35  .30  wc 
-  AK AP" 
AK~AKP  -- 
AL ALP  QC 
-  3 
-  AK AF" 
AL AL"" 
AL ALP  ws 
AL ALP  W" 
-I-  WP 
4 
-  .98*  -.48  35  .36  wc 
wc 
AKJAIP  --  5 
6  AK/AIP  --  -  .89*  -.32  35  .27 
NOTE:  For definitions of  terms see notes to table 6.11. 
* = Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
An attempt is made in the equations of table 6.13 to test for response to 
relative prices of skilled (salaried) and unskilled (wage) labor. Although 
little of  the variation in skill ratios was explained by the relative price 
variable, there was a statistically significant response in the expected 
direction. In  affiliates where the price of  skilled labor was high, the 
proportion of skilled workers, adjusted for the industry mix of  the affili- 
ate's production, tended to be low (equations 1  and 2). The relationship 
was stronger among countries (equations 3 and 4). In countries  where the 
price of skilled labor was relatively high, the proportion used was low. 
Whatever this crude "skill"  ratio measures, whether it is truly skill or 
education, or perhaps the distinction between white-collar and blue- 
collar workers, Swedish firms did appear to respond to differences in 
relative prices among countries by  adjusting the proportions of  the two 
types of  labor. 
6.8  Results of  Other Studies 
The study most similar to ours was that of  Courtney and Leipziger 
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Table 6.13  Relation of  Skill Intensity to Price of Skilled Labor 
(Individual Swedish Affiliates and 
Affiliates Aggregated by Country, 1974) 
Coefficients 
Skill Intensity  Skilled  Number 
Equation (Dependent)  Skilled Labor  Labor  Constant  of Obser-  - 
Number  Variable  Price Variable  Price  Term  vations  RZ 
2  -.32*  -.01  423  .07 
NOTE: 
Lsa,  and Lwngr  = Number of  salaried and wage workers. 
L::,  and Ls;&  = Number of  salaried and wage workers that would be employed by  an 
affiliate  at  Swedish  industry ratios of  salaried and wage  workers to 
output. 
LT0, and  = Number of  salaried and wage workers that would be employed by  an 
affiliate at parent ratios of  salaried and wage workers to output. 
w,,,  and wWoge  = Average salary per salaried worker and wage per wage worker. 
w:;  and w”w”.ge  = Average salary per salaried worker and average wage per wage worker 
that affiliate would  have given  at affiliate industry. mix  and Swedish 
salary levels. 
wfar and wc,,  = Average salary per salaried worker and average wage per wage worker in 
parent companies. 
c = Country aggregates. 
* = Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
already noted, their study concentrated on separating observed differ- 
ences in capital intensity between affiliates in developed countries and 
those in LDCs (k,  and k3 in figure 6.3) into the unobserved differences in 
the choice of  technology (k,  and k2),  or “ex ante substitution” in their 
terms, and the unobserved substitution within the chosen technology (k2 
and k3),  or “ex post substitution.” Courtney and Leipziger assumed two 
technologies in each industry, one for developed country affiliates and 
one for affiliates in LDCs. 
Their results contained some puzzling findings. They found significant 
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those in LDCs in six out of eleven industries, and in three of  these it was 
the affiliates in LDCs that were using the more capital-intensive technol- 
ogy: that is, they were using, by the authors’ interpretation, more capi- 
tal-intensive plant designs. However, the response to wage levels being 
lower  in  LDCs  than  in  developed  countries was  so  large  that even 
industries using more capital-intensive technologies in LDCs ended up 
with  comparatively  labor-intensive  production  there.  Since the most 
capital-intensive technologies in LDCs, relative to developed countries, 
were associated with the highest elasticities of  substitution, there is a 
question whether the authors were really successful in separating the 
choice of  technology or plant design from the response to factor prices. 
Other studies of factor use in multinational firms’ operations in LDCs 
have been mainly case studies of particular industries or groups of plants. 
On the whole, the results have been inconclusive, with some reporting 
extensive adaptation and others reporting virtually none. Since adapta- 
tion is not always clearly defined, or  the definitions differ among studies, 
and since most studies refer to narrow segments of  industry, it is not 
certain  whether they  contradict  each other or simply observe  actual 
differences in behavior among industries or countries. 
A study by Morley and Smith (1974) examined the choice of  technol- 
ogy by multinational firms in Brazil, largely on the basis of  interviews and 
the authors’ views rather than any substantial statistical evidence on the 
operation of  plants. Their main conclusion was that there were very large 
differences in technology between the United States firms at home and 
their affiliates in Brazil. However, they explained the difference as an 
adaptation to  differences in the scale of production rather than in relative 
factor prices. They argued that the production function is not homothetic 
and that at any factor prices small-scale production would be relatively 
labor-intensive and large-scale production capital-intensive. 
It is worth mentioning again in this connection that a major role for 
scale in determining factor proportions does not preclude a role for factor 
costs in adaptation even if there is no response to factor prices at a given 
level of  production. It may be only the cheapness of labor in LDCs that 
permits  the existence  of  small,  labor-intensive  plants  that could  not 
survive in the high labor cost environment of the developed countries. 
The amount of protection required to sustain small-scale, labor-intensive 
production may be much less in LDC, with low wages, than in a de- 
veloped country with its high wage levels. The adaptation by multina- 
tional  firms  may  thus be attributable to both the smallness of  LDC 
markets and the low labor costs. 
Examples of  adaptation in  the sense of  both selection of  stages of 
production and selection of production techniques were found in a study 
by Finan (1975) of United States direct investment and technology trans- 
fer in the semiconductor industry. American firms tended to place the 252  Robert E. LipseylIrving B. KravislRomualdo A. Roldan 
labor-intensive assembly stage of production in low-wage foreign coun- 
tries while confining the more capital-intensive and technology-intensive 
wafer fabrication stage to the United States and to affiliates in developed 
countries. However, within the assembly stage, production  was more 
capital-intensive in the United States  than abroad. A substantial number 
of  automated assembly lines were in operation in the United States, but 
there were none in foreign operations. 
Cohen (1975),  in a study of  foreign-owned and locally owned plants in 
Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, not identified by industry, men- 
tions that National Semiconductor and Texas Instruments were produc- 
ing integrated circuits using highly automated techniques in these coun- 
tries, a fact he interprets as lack of  adaptation, though he presents no 
comparison with home country methods of production. 
6.9  Conclusions 
The purpose of our investigation was to learn whether multinational 
firms responded to differences among countries in the price of  labor by 
using more labor-intensive methods of  production in low-wage countries, 
either  by  selecting  labor-intensive  subindustries,  selecting  labor-in- 
tensive processes within industries, selecting small-scale operations for 
which only labor-intensive  methods were available, or operating in a 
labor-intensive way whatever technologies were selected. We found that, 
for both Swedish and United States multinational firms, parent company 
or home country capital intensities of  production, as measured by total 
assets per worker or by  fixed assets alone, were higher than those of 
affiliates in developed countries, and that these in turn were higher than 
those of  affiliates in less developed countries. These differences were not 
primarily  the result  of  industry  selection,  at  least  among the broad 
industry groups used here: in fact, in some cases it was capital-intensive 
industries that tended to invest  abroad, particularly in less developed 
countries. 
Among countries in which affiliates were located, a higher price of 
labor was associated with higher capital intensities of  affiliates in the 
aggregate for all manufacturing  and within  manufacturing industries. 
Some  of the relation for manufacturing as a group represented a tendency 
for affiliates in labor-intensive industries to settle in low-wage countries, 
but the main element was the relation of  capital intensity to wage levels 
within industries. 
Within individual companies there is again a strong effect of  wage 
levels on capital intensity. Some of  the intraindustry effect noted above 
could have been the result of  selection among companies, more labor- 
intensive companies being more attracted to low-wage countries. How- 
ever, the main intraindustry effect was the result of  adaptation within 253  Do Multinational Firms Adapt Factor Proportions to Factor Prices? 
companies, whether  by  selection among products or processes or by 
adaptation of particular production processes. We also found, in the data 
for individual companies, a strong effect of  scale of operations on capital 
intensity when that was defined as property, plant, and equipment per 
worker. Scale had very little effect, and sometimes a negative effect, on 
capital intensity measured by  total assets per worker. 
While the United States data, even for individual firms in an industry, 
could contain some industry-mix effects, because some firms and even 
affiliates produce in several industries and could vary the industry mix 
from country to country, we could reduce that effect in the Swedish data, 
for which we know the industry mix of  each affiliate’s production. The 
results there seem to show even stronger indications that firms respond to 
low wage rates by  producing in a labor-intensive way. 
Notes 
1. We can see this relationship most clearly in a very simple example, abstracting from 
transport costs, differences in factor costs and factor prices, and the possible existence of 
intermediate products. If  there are decreasing costs up to some level of output, j, perhaps 
the level at which some indivisible unit of capital is fully utilized, and constant costs above j, 
we have the type of  unit cost function shown in the accompanying diagram. 
Unit 
cost 
kI  output 
A producer in a small country, operating at output k, could not compete in his own market 
with large producers unless he had a protective tariff of  50 percent.  Such a tariff would 
inflate both the value of  his output and his value added. If  output is then measured by value 
added in a production function fitted across countries, the inefficiency of  the small producer 
is concealed, different scales of production appear to be equally efficient, and the estimated 
production function implies constant returns to scale. 
2.  Among the seven countries included in the  two poorest groups above,  four were 
studied  in NBER’s project  on foreign  trade regimes and economic development.  The 
effective rates of  protection for years closest to 1970, as calculated in the NBER studies or 
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Colombia (1970) 
India (1968-69) 
Philippines (1965) 
South Korea (1968) 
Nonelectrical  Electrical 
Machinery  Machinery 
33  57 
- 88  120 
112" 
103b 
44" 
3Ob 
"Balassa measure. 
bCorden measure. 
Data are from Bhagwati  and Srinivasan  (1975), p.  179, Balassa  (1971), p.  279, Diaz- 
Alejandro (1976), p. 60),  and Frank, Kim, and Westphal(l975, pp. 198-99). 
3.  A possibility that might be worth exploring is to measure the price of  labor by average 
wage for the country as a whole deflated by the average labor quality index and to measure 
skill intensity for a given affiliate or group of  affiliates by the ratio of average wage paid to 
the average national wage. 
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